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Abstract 
At the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire expanded its diplomatic ties with 
many world powers, in hopes of remaining the gateway to the Middle East.  The empire 
remained a target for land acquisition by Britain, France, and Russia through their expansion of 
imperialist interests.  The United States at this time was a budding superpower that established a 
diplomatic tie with the Ottomans through Henry Morgenthau, the United States diplomat to 
Constantinople.  The United States attempted to use its neutrality and diplomacy to keep the 
Ottoman Empire out of the Great War, prolonging the eventual Ottoman entry into World War I.   
The United States created a unique bond with the Ottoman Empire due to its lack of interest in 
Ottoman lands, but with more of an interest in building an economic, social, and political 
relationship.  Scholars have overlooked the history of the United States’ interests within the 
Ottoman Empire during the few months leading up to the Great War.  As such, historians have 
missed the beginning stages of the United States becoming a global superpower.  Using the 
primary sources from the United States’ National Archives, this essay will discuss the untold 
history of American interests within the Ottoman Empire. 
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The United States (US) attempted to use its neutrality and diplomacy to keep the Ottoman 
Empire out of the Great War, prolonging the eventual Ottoman entry into World War I.  Because 
the US was not yet a world superpower, it advanced its political, social, and economic interests 
in the Ottoman Empire through diplomacy.  This history of American interests within the 
Ottoman Empire, during the build up of Ottoman entry into the Great War, is missing in the 
historiography of this topic. The United States’ relationship with the Ottoman Empire lasted 
longer than other countries due to efforts to appease officials in order to preserve access to 
Middle Eastern markets. The United States’ businesses were concerned with rising unrest within 
the empire as this affected their interests.  
The United States’ political, social, and economic interests within the Ottoman Empire 
became the main focus for a strategic relationship with the Ottomans.  Political interest drove the 
Americans to defend their allies within the empire against any and all threats from the local 
Ottoman administrations.  The US ambassador to Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau, wrote 
about the threat to Greek and American interests: “On one hand were the Germans, urging their 
well-known ideas of repression and brutality, while on the other were the Turks, with their 
traditional hatred of Christians and their natural instinct to maltreat those who are helplessly 
placed in their power.”1 Morgenthau suggested that an Ottoman-German alliance would make it 
hard for him to create a mutual alliance between the US and the Ottomans. The Americans used 
every tactic at their disposal to defend their interests within this hostile environment, but 
changing laws and policies led to the loss of American privileges within the empire. During the 
                                               
1 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918), 
131. 
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Ottoman mobilization for war, the government officials targeted American business properties 
and raided American businesses to fuel the Ottoman assemblage for war.   
 During the game of United States’ diplomacy within the Ottoman Empire, Henry 
Morgenthau, from 1913-1916, was the US Ambassador to Constantinople.2 As a Jewish man, 
Morgenthau debated taking the ambassador position with one scholar stating, “‘Jews represented 
a natural bridge between Muslim Turks and Christian Americans merely rankled Morgenthau 
who, having no diplomatic experience, felt that he was more qualified for a cabinet-level position 
in the American government.”3  Morgenthau felt that although his heritage helped him in 
working with Christians and Muslims, he lacked the diplomatic experience to engage in those 
conversations.  In addition to Morgenthau, there were a few other consuls that reported to him 
directly in the region. Communication between the Ottoman Empire to the American Consulates 
were from local Viziers.  The main Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) member that was 
involved in many of the decisions was Ismail Enver Pasha, Minister of War.  Enver Pasha led the 
Ottoman Empire into an alliance with Germany and the end of the Ottoman Empire.4   
The most recent research for this topic is Karine Walther’s Sacred Interests: The United 
States and the Islamic World, 1821- 1921 (2015).  She uses Henry Morgenthau's biographies to 
showcase the beginnings of the US and Ottoman relationship. Walther portrays the impact 
Morgenthau had within the empire, protecting US allies’ interests while also protecting Greek 
interests.  The main argument of her work focuses on Henry Morgenthau’s impact on the crisis 
                                               
2 Within American primary sources, Istanbul was referred to as Constantinople when referring to the 
American Consulate.  The United States also refers to the Ottoman Empire as Turkey.   
 
3 Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), Quoted in Karine V. Walther, Sacred Interests: The United States and the 
Islamic World, 1821-1921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 279.  
 
4 See Appendix B. 
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of the Armenians, skipping over US interests within the empire.  She is the leading scholar to 
begin research into United States’ relations with the Ottoman Empire but she does not use the 
diplomatic records from the United States’ consulate in Constantinople.  This thesis will add to 
her work by consulting diplomatic records that have not previously been used.  Her work is at the 
forefront of this topic, building on the earlier works of Şükrü Hanioğlu’s A Brief History of the 
Late Ottoman Empire (2008) and Stanford Shaw’s The Ottoman Empire in World War I (2006).   
Hanioğlu and Shaw were able to construct the narrative of the Young Turk movement 
allowing historians to grasp the concepts of Ottoman politics.  The Young Turk movement, also 
known as CUP, came to power shortly after the revolution of 1908, but power was further 
consolidated at the conclusion of the Second Balkan War.  This movement revolutionized the 
government by creating a more modern bureaucracy. These works show how the Young Turk 
movement operated within the Ottoman Empire, giving the Ottoman perspective on this series of 
events.  The US tried to intervene in the Ottoman Empire by prolonging “the life of the empire 
considerably if they opted for armed neutrality in 1914.”5 The Young Turk movement is the 
main reason for the successes of United States’ foreign policy within the empire.  The limitation 
of only focusing on political history and the viewpoint of the Ottoman Empire, hinders the 
understanding of how the Ottoman government worked within global interests.  Both of their 
works focused on the political history of the empire, while current scholarship is looking other 
angles of this event through the lens of other groups.   
 Eugene Rogan’s The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East: War, 
Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East (2015) and Sean McMeekin’s The 
                                               
5 Şükrü M. Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008), 4. 
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Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923 
(2015) represents current research on Ottoman military history. Rogan and McMeekin provided 
data that shows the exports of what was going through the Dardanelles Strait, showing that 
Russia’s economy relied on the strait to remain open with limited interruption.6 This portrays the 
reasoning behind the United States’ desire for a neutrality agreement from the Ottoman Empire. 
This agreement would have allowed Russia greater prosperity on the Eastern front had it 
remained open during the war.  This research gives a better understanding of why the Ottoman 
Empire mattered to the Entente powers, showing that the Dardanelles affected Russia’s 
economy.  The major source used by both scholars was Mustafa Aksakal’s The Ottoman Road to 
War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (2008) and is foundational to both 
of their arguments.   
Leila Fawaz’s A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War (2014) adds 
to Walther’s work by providing the Lebanese viewpoint of the Great War, using primary sources 
from Lebanon. Fawaz’s work shows the prosperous relationship between Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire which was due to the lack of German territorial ambitions in the Ottoman 
Empire.7 She fully supports this claim through Germany’s willingness to finance a railroad to run 
from Berlin to Baghdad. This railroad became the foundation for a unique relationship between 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire.  As European rights became more oppressed in the empire, 
Germans kept their rights even after capitulations were abolished.8 This work suggests that a US 
                                               
6 Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 
2015), 32.  
 
7  Leila Fawaz, A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War (Harvard University Press, 
2014), 40. 
 
8 Capitulations within the Ottoman Empire allowed foreigners to retain their rights and privileges granted 
in their country of origin.   
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alliance was doomed from the start.  However, she does not recognize the United States’ 
involvement within the Ottoman Empire, focusing solely on the empire itself and Germany.  
Walther, Fawaz, McMeekin, and Rogan do an excellent job of laying the foundation from 
which current scholarship can build. However, they overlook points about United States’ foreign 
policy, the impact it had within the empire, and the effects the empire had on American interests. 
Their works do not consult sources such as Howard Jones’s The Crucible of Power: A History of 
American Foreign Relations to 1913 (2002) which illustrates the US’ foreign policy up to 1913.  
Jones’s work built on Stephen Cooney’s Political Demand Channels in the Processes of 
American Political and British Imperial Expansion, 1870-1913 (1975) which compared the US’ 
imperialist goals during the era of New Manifest Destiny to that of Great Britain.  Without either 
of these sources, their works do not delve deep enough into the US’ involvement within the 
Ottoman Empire in 1914 to maintain US’ political, social, and military interests.   
The research for this paper relies largely on the correspondence of the United States’ 
consulates in the Ottoman Empire.  These telegrams show what was going on within the empire 
until about November 1914 from the US viewpoint, which is when the Ottomans became fully 
engaged in the Great War.  While these sources do provide the context of what is transpiring on 
the government level when used in conjunction with Henry Morgenthau’s biographies, they 
provide a clear depiction from an American point-of-view.  The American viewpoint is a web of 
economic, political, and social interests that consistently correlate to each other throughout this 
essay suggesting that they all inadvertently affect each other. These sources add to Karine 
Walther’s work covering the summer of 1914 to the crisis of the Armenians in 1915.   
Until recently, scholarship neglected American business interests.  Walther briefly 
discusses Singer Sewing Machine Company stating that they “conducted millions of dollars’ 
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worth of business through hundreds of stores throughout the empire.”9 However, Walther did not 
discuss the Standard Oil Company or Buffalo Specialty Company.  The economics of these three 
companies declined when the Ottoman government seized products and machinery from the first 
two companies beginning on September 3, 1914.  However, Buffalo Specialty Company was 
unable to start a Middle Eastern branch of business within a country mobilizing for war.  
Economically, these three businesses represented a few of the American interests within the 
Ottoman Empire.   
The Standard Oil Co. and Vacuum Oil Co. began facing problems in June 1914, when the 
Ottoman government began deporting Greek employees without just cause.  The atmosphere 
affecting American businesses in the Ottoman Empire calmed from June through July. However, 
on September 3, 1914, the Ottoman government seized kerosene oil and gasoline from both 
companies.10  The Ottoman government did this to supply the mobilization of the military with 
American goods.  While gasoline was at the early stages for use in automobiles, the Ottoman 
government required kerosene to power lamps.  A month later, after the Ottoman government 
seized gasoline and oil, the government began arresting Standard Oil employees. 
The problem for company employees was that the Ottoman government would search for 
them to further requisition goods that anyone may still have. The military went into the yards of 
these businesses and arrest those that they believed violated the law, whether they did so or not.  
“On Saturday, October 3, 1914, Mr. Stanley Smith, local director of the Standard Oil Company, 
came hurriedly in search of the Consul-General and reported that there had been an invasion of 
the company’s depot at Daragatch by armed police or gendarmes, who were threatening to carry 
                                               
9 Walther, Sacred Interests (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015),  281. 
  
10 Aleppo to Constantinople, September 3rd, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (37.2). 
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off to the police station Mr. Finkelstein.”11  While this was an instance of the prosecution of 
Greeks within the empire due to the invasion on American business property, the Ottomans 
targeted Americans and Turks for being at the wrong place, at the wrong time.  It was because of 
these types of incidences that a company like Standard Oil was constantly losing its employees.  
On October 26, 1914, the Ottoman military used the gasoline they requisitioned, in addition to 
local fire pumps for the “spraying of oil on the buildings thus facilitating the burning of them.”12 
The spraying of oil on the buildings was a threat to the Entente powers that if they would attack 
the empire, the Ottomans were going to burn Smyrna down.  This was a cause for huge alarm 
because Standard Oil Co. had property interests invested worth around $65,000 without 
considering what the buildings were worth.13  This would be around $1,565,544.50 worth of 
property today.14  Although the city of Smyrna was not burned to the ground, the actions taken 
by Ottoman officials showed how desperate the country was to threaten European intervention 
with empire affairs.  This intimidation was used as a threat against the Entente powers; had they 
attacked, Smyrna would have most likely burned to the ground.   
The Singer Manufacturing Co. faced similar conditions to that of Standard Oil, though 
what was taken from and performed against Singer Manufacturing was far worse.  Singer 
Manufacturing’s interests were affected because they “conducted millions of dollars’ worth of 
business through hundreds of stores throughout the empire,”15 with locations such as Izmir and 
                                               
11 Smyrna to Constantinople, October 6th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M365, Roll 7 Ext. (15.1). 
 
12 Aleppo to Constantinople, October 26th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M365, Roll 8. (3.1). 
 
13 Aleppo to Constantinople, October 26th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M365, Roll 8. (3.1). 
 
14 Coin News, US Inflation Calculator (Coinnews Media Group LLC, 2015).  
 
15 Walther, Sacred Interests(Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015),  281.  
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other islands around Anatolia depending on their Greek workforce.  Singer had operated in the 
empire for more than five years by this time but “In June 1914, the Ottoman authorities ordered 
the boycott of Christian businesses and the deportation of 40,000 Greeks from Izmir, where 
Singer had four stores.”16 It was common for Singer Manufacturing to include workers of Greek 
descent in their workforce and this deportation caused a large workforce shortage for not only 
the four stores in Izmir, but across the empire.  The company viewed the deportation of workers 
as a “serious detriment of business of the company.”17  The Ottomans responded to the company 
suggesting that 40,000 Greek employees could be easily replaced by Turks without affecting  
businesses.  On June 19, 1914, “the interior agents of the Singer Manufacturing Co. had been 
driven out leaving their shops; that American firm requested safe-conducts for their agents to 
return to their posts otherwise the company would sustain serious loss.”18 The threat against the 
agents of Singer Manufacturing pushed the business to send a letter to the local consul 
demanding the protection of its interests.  It was not until two months later that Singer 
Manufacturing faced its next hurdle.  
 During the months when the Ottomans were seizing goods from American businesses, 
after they had already taken goods from other foreigners, they indiscriminately stole goods for 
the war effort. The Ottoman government seized kerosene oil and gasoline from Standard Oil and 
Vacuum Oil but also requisitioned from Singer Manufacturing “3 sewing machines taken 
directly from the Company’s store rooms, and about 20 (exact number still unknown) machines 
                                               
16 Walther, Sacred Interests (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015), 281.  
 
17 Constantinople to Washington, June 11th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. 
867.00/626. (1.1). 
 
18 Constantinople to Washington, June 19th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. 
867.00/630. (3). 
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were taken from clients who had not completed payment therefor.”19  The Ottomans did not 
differentiate what could be taken from people and businesses to support the Ottoman war 
machine.  Neither the National Archives, nor Walther has documents regarding anything else 
about Singer Manufacturing.  These companies represented businesses previously established in 
the empire; however, it was especially hard for businesses to expand into the empire during the 
months at the beginning of the Great War.    
One such company was Buffalo Specialty Co. which had interest in expanding its liquid 
veneer within the Ottoman Empire, but ran into multiple obstacles. The company gave a Mr. 
Nicolaides liquid veneer to start distributing to the populous, though they had only met this man 
once, entrusting him without knowing who he was as a person.  Shortly after Mr. Nicolaides 
received the veneer, he disappeared in the Ottoman Empire, failing to contact Buffalo Specialty 
with updates of his venture.  Buffalo Specialty sent a letter to the American Consul in 
Constantinople, looking for the whereabouts of this man Mr. Nicolaides, who was supposed to 
be introducing their liquid veneer, but had not contacted the business to begin the new branch of 
the company.20 The consul responded that it is not typically within their job to locate a man in 
another country, however they were able to locate Mr. Nicolaides to get the company an answer.  
The consulate also informed the company that Mr. Nicolaides was not a great man to trust as he 
had multiple interests within the empire.  The company responded and valued the liquid veneer 
at $40.00 and stated that they simply wanted it returned if the man was not going to hand them 
out to start a business.  However, the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant replied to 
                                               
19 Aleppo to Constantinople, September 3rd, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (37.2). 
 
20 Buffalo Specialty Company, April 15th, 1914 (National Archives), General Records, RG 84, Turkey, Box 
6-8. (IMG_2046). 
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Buffalo Specialty Co. that they “have interviewed this gentleman who states that he still has in 
his possession the 2,000 bottles of liquid veneer and that he has not been able to start a business 
in this article, but hopes to do so, as soon as the economic condition of the market shall have 
improved.”21  Buffalo Specialty Co. gave Mr. Nicolaides a few more months and attempted to 
reach out to him in November to find out the status of their venture. 
Buffalo Specialty sent another letter November 12, 1914, inquiring if Nicolaides had 
secured business for the company.  The company wished that the consul would invite Mr. 
Nicolaides to their office and have him provide a statement of what he intended to do with the 
samples.22  This statement from the company dictates a lack of trust between the company and 
Mr. Nicolaides after learning how Mr. Nicolaides does business.  The company was not aware of 
the news that the Ottoman Empire had just entered World War I, not realizing that Mr. 
Nicolaides had their interests at heart.  The consulate recognized this and sent back a letter 
stating, “I would like to call to your attention to the complete paralysis of trade which has been 
caused by the present international situation and the utter impossibility of the pushing of your 
interests for the moment.”23  Trade came to a halt in and out of the empire due to the abolition of 
capitulations and Ottoman entry into the Great War.  The company realized what was going on 
in the world shortly after they received this piece of mail but even in October, this was not a 
good time to start a business and Mr. Nicolaides saved this company from an unfortunate fate.   
                                               
21 American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant, May 26th, 1914 (National Archives), General Records, 
RG 84, Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2051). 
 
22 Buffalo Specialty Company, November 12th, 1914 (National Archives), General Records, RG 84, 
Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2055). 
 
23 Consulate General of Constantinople, December 8th, 1914 (National Archives), General Records, RG 84, 
Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2056). 
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The fate of American companies within the Ottoman Empire began to deteriorate during 
the months leading up to the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I.  It is especially 
important to note that Standard Oil Co., Vacuum Oil Co., and Singer Manufacturing Co., faced 
similar issues when it came to the government requisitioning goods for military use. As Consul J. 
B. Jackson in Aleppo, Syria,  reflected the Ottoman government’s taking of goods as “American 
Citizens Plundered.”24  Buffalo Manufacturing Co. did not face the same problems as the other 
companies because it had not established itself yet.  Though had it been established, it would 
have most surely failed as a business, losing its new Middle Eastern foothold.  
In addition to creating economic prospects within the Ottoman Empire, the United States 
was interested in building a political relationship with the Empire.  This relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire had to do with the United States’ international standing, who its allies were, and 
using diplomacy and their newly formed Navy to create a sense of power.  Henry Morgenthau 
used these tools and tactics to keep the US neutral when all of its allies were at war with each 
other.  This was done prior to the beginning of the war and up until the US could no longer help 
through their use of “consult authority,”25 which could “protect the people if necessary.”26  This 
became the political stance of the US for the next six months.   
 The international standing of the United States during this time was that of a chief 
diplomat.  Henry Morgenthau knew that if he could successfully create a bond with the Ottoman 
Empire, he could create a unique relationship to unlock the rest of the Middle East.  However, to 
                                               
24 Aleppo to Constantinople, September 3rd, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (37.2). 
 
25 Smyrna to Washington, June 18th, 1914 (National Archives of the United States), Microfilm. RG 84, 
Box M353, Roll 5. 867.00/629. (2). 
 
26 Smyrna to Washington, June 18th, 1914 (National Archives of the United States), Microfilm. RG 84, Box 
M353, Roll 5. 867.00/629. (2). 
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do this he had to show the Ottomans that the US was a friend of the empire through his ability to 
create political and social change, while also being able to defuse intense situations within the 
empire. Morgenthau’s ability to create a bond with the Ottoman Empire was noticed when 
“Ottoman officials expressed their fury with the US for promising to deliver two warships to 
Greece” which resulted in violence against the Greek population within the Ottoman Empire.27  
The Young Turks believed that “deporting non-Turks constituted part of their modern nation-
building efforts and that it removed a significant national security threat.”28 Morgenthau used the 
American press to show the American public the massacres of Ottoman-Christian subjects; the 
Young Turks believed that this was necessary for a modern nation, while making the violence 
inherently worse.  Although press tactics worked for the time being; the threats against 
Americans, American allies, and American interests led Morgenthau to deploy naval vessels to 
the area from time to time.   
The first American allies at risk were Greek citizens, with relations becoming intensified 
when “Ottoman officials expressed their fury with the United States for promising to deliver two 
warships to Greece.”29 After the US sold the two ships to Greece, the Ottoman government 
“accused the United States of compromising its own neutrality.”30 The main issue for Karine 
Walther regarding this Ottoman accusation of the United States were that the attacks carried out 
against the Greeks were “Contrary to claims that Ottoman actions were the result of primitive 
Islamic fanaticism,” but rather it was believed by the Ottomans that their “modern imperial state 
                                               
27 Walther, Sacred Interests (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015), 281.  
 
28 Walther, Sacred Interests (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015), 282. 
 
29 Walther, Sacred Interests (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015),  281. 
 
30 Walther, Sacred Interests (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015),  281. 
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was victimized by rebellious populations.”31  The Ottomans were in a constant struggle with 
radicals within their empire, who challenged the changes made by the new government. 
Morgenthau feared that the Ottoman government would “intern them, establish concentration 
camps, pursue them with German malignity, and perhaps apply the favourite Turkish measure 
with Christians-torture and massacre.”32  However, Morgenthau’s hope for Turkish humility 
eventually subsided after continuous attacks against the Greeks.  
The attacks on Greeks took a great toll on Morgenthau’s ethics as he felt it was important 
for the United States to stand up for the defenseless. He avowed that he “now told Enver, she 
would have to treat enemy foreigners in a civilized way.”33  During the summer months, the US 
sold two warships to Greece to bolster their defences against the rise of Turkish nationalism.  On 
June 19, 1914, Ottoman officials pushed Greeks out of their businesses and the Greeks flocked to 
the coast to escape from the boycotters.34  Morgenthau immediately saw the boycotters as an 
issue for American business, but also a Greek issue, due to the matter of forced migration.  He 
immediately sent a telegram to the Grand Vizier suggesting that he grant an extension to all 
Greeks employed by Americans a delay of two months to move.35  The Grand Vizier reluctantly 
agreed to this and suggested that they be replaced by Turks.  Morgenthau performed similar tasks 
for Russia.    
                                               
31 Walther, Sacred Interests (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015), 282. 
 
32 Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (1918), 130. 
 
33 Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (1918), 131. 
 
34 Constantinople to Washington, June 19th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/630. (3). 
 
35 Constantinople to Washington (National Archives), Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/630. (3). 
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Russia was at risk from Ottoman aggression during the summer of 1914, due to the 
budding relationship of the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Germany continued to build its 
relationship with the Ottomans, eventually creating a secret pact; supported by “a general 
consensus among Turks in favour of the German alliance, for it ended Turkey’s isolation.”36  The 
Ottoman-German secret pact meant that Ottomans would remain neutral, but would begin to 
mobilize their military in case of an attack from Russia on Bulgaria, allowing Germany to 
provide “German gold to subvene Turkey’s war effort.”37  George Horton proclaimed there was 
“much enthusiasm amongst Moslems in favor of the war as they hope to march against 
Russia.”38 Russia, a US ally, had the most at stake when it came to the Ottoman Empire’s 
neutrality because the Dardanelles Strait controlled Russia’s trade coming from the Aegean Sea 
and the rest of the Mediterranean. The Dardanelles’ trade was drastically affected by what 
happened in the Ottoman Empire, as seen in 1912 with the collapse of Russia’s economy during 
the Second Balkan War.39  On September 27, the closure of the strait made an immediate effect 
on Ottoman trade, but the Russians felt the effect shortly thereafter resulting in hundreds of ships 
filled with exports becoming trapped in the Black Sea.40 Ottoman hostilities toward Russia had 
increased over time, eventually leading to an attack on Russian ports in the Black Sea as the 
                                               
36 Leila Fawaz, A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), 41.   
 
37 Sean McMeekin, The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 
1908-1923 (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 127.   
 
38 Haifa to Beirut, August 6th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M353, Roll 5. (19). 
 
39 See Appendix C. 
 
40 Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 
2015), 42. 
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Ottomans entered World War I.  Anti-French and British sentiments did not begin until August 
with the arrival of the two German cruisers, the Goeben and the Breslau. 
 With the Ottoman Navy in control of the German cruisers the Goeben and the Breslau, 
they posed a threat to France, Great Britain, and Greece.41  The arrival of these two ships forced 
the United States to provide a more active naval presence in the area.  The arrival of the USS 
North Carolina helped to defuse the situation in Beirut as “The arrival of the North Carolina 
yesterday morning brought a joy, peace of mind and great rejoicing to the inhabitants of 
Beirut.”42 The people in Beirut were thrilled to have a foreign power in their area as it would 
protect them from increasing threats of riots and boycotts throughout Beirut.  Two days after the 
USS North Carolina’s departure it was feared that an attack was imminent by the Ottoman 
Empire. This fear that an attack was imminent was attributed to the report released on September 
25, 1914, when the American-Consulate commentated that the Ottomans could be contemplating 
carrying out an attack against one of the countries belonging to the Entente alliance.43  The 
arrival of a United States’ man-of-war reduced tensions in the region as the ship gave a sense of 
peace among all those allied with the US. Though this peace would quickly dissipate among the 
allies due to the refusal to remove the German sailors from the Goeben and the Breslau in 
Istanbul.44    
                                               
41 Henry Morgenthau to Secretary of State, August 8-11, 1914, The Ambassador in Turkey (Morgenthau) 
to the Secretary of State, Outbreak of The War- Projects of Mediation, Foreign Relations of the United States 
Database (FRUS), University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries, Digital Collections, 763.72/447.  
 
42 Beirut to Washington, September 24th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/689. (43). 
 
43 Beirut to Washington, September 25th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/690. (44). 
 
44 Constantinople to Washington, October 19th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/692. 
(45.2). 
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 The use of the United States’ Navy from September to late October, 1914, provided 
peace during difficult times.  Scholars have neglected the effectiveness of the USS North 
Carolina and USS Tennessee to keep American political interests afloat in the Ottoman Empire.   
The comings and goings of these two ships constantly brought peace to the areas in which they 
made port, relieving the people by providing a sense of peace and stability within the cities they 
visited.  It was not until the USS North Carolina left that Henry Morgenthau stated: 
I think that I can safely say that all the law abiding, non-fanatical, and well 
disposed inhabitants of beirut, irrespective of race, color, nationality or religion, 
are anxiously hoping and praying for the speedy return of the ‘North Carolina’, 
as the presence of an American man-of-war here during such times as these is 
practically an insurance against all outbreaks and outrages on the part of 
fanatics and evil doers of Beirut.45  
 
The people in Beirut depended on the United States to protect its interests because this protection 
ensured the safety of all foreigners and not just the Americans.  Nevertheless, Morgenthau 
believed that the method of making port should only happen sparingly, saying that “Smyrna 
people are again requesting a war vessel.  They are justified in feeling somewhat alarmed as 
Turkish officials continue making threats in case of foreign invasion yet I do not believe it 
advisable to have a war vessel go there.”46  Eventually, things deteriorated further in Beirut and 
there was need for American ships to stabilize the region once again.  On October 24, 1914, the 
USS North Carolina and USS Tennessee made port in Beirut. The American Consulate-General 
in Beirut stated “The presence of these two vessels has a most beneficial and tranquilizing effect 
upon all the inhabitants here, the great majority of whom sleep sounder at night.”47  The 
                                               
45 Beirut to Washington, September 24th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/689. (43). 
 
46 Constantinople to Washington, October 1th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M365, Roll 7, 711.673/45. 
(10). 
 
47 Beirut to Washington, October 24th, 1914 (National Archives), Box M365, Roll 8, 867.00/709. (1). 
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utilization of the United States’ Navy gave American ambassadors in the region, a tool to create 
peace, but also provided militaristic support to their allies if needed.  The American allies used 
these ships as a defense for their embassies which were increasingly under threat by the 
Ottomans.   
 The American ambassadors were successful in protecting their political and economic 
interests within the area because of their place within Ottoman society.  While the Ottoman 
government pursued foreigners, the Americans were able to stay within the empire the longest.  
The Americans were able to keep Ottoman officials away long enough to take into their 
possession important belongings of France and Great Britain’s consulates. After placing 
important government documents within the United States’ consulate, the French ambassador 
urgently fled the country, “Consul de France désire quitter avec famille s’il y a moyen de quitter 
Constantinople Samedi ou plus tard pour la France”(The Consul of France desires to leave with 
his family, and wonders if there was a way to leave Constantinople Saturday or later for 
France).48 The interaction between the France consul and Henry Morgenthau demonstrates that 
the US’ international standing was that of a neutral power, but also an ally to the Entente powers 
because of the US’ foreign relationship with France and Great Britain.  This suggests that 
perhaps the reason for increasing hostility from the Ottomans to the United States was due to the 
US’ ties to the Entente powers.  The US constantly challenged Ottoman neutrality, hoping that 
the empire would remain neutral.  Ultimately, the US’ Navy ensured the protection of American 
economic, political, and social interests, while also protecting its allies within the Ottoman 
Empire.   
                                               
 
48 Constantinople to Washington, November 4th, 1914 (National Archives), General Records, RG 84, 
Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2183). trans. from French by Robert Nowland. 
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The Ottoman Empire welcomed the United States with open arms because the US was 
more interested in expanding business in the empire.  The expansion of business came with 
Americans that were employed by the companies to run them. What began as an issue for Greeks 
transpired into an issue for Americans who were caught in the crossfire being driven away with 
the same whips used against Greeks by boycotters standing in front of Greek shops.49  Although 
this began before the war, this event was the beginning of what Americans would continue to 
face.  Eventually, Ottoman officials would receive word to “commandeer all horses, mules and 
camels fit for military service,”50 showing that property was not valued when it came to military 
mobilization and that consulates were powerless to protect foreign interests.  This was not 
exclusive to Americans as French merchandise was unlawfully taken by the Vali about six days 
later.   
 American economic, political, and social interests were in a state of limbo as European 
privileges were abridged by increasing pressures of the Ottoman government.  While the 
Ottoman Empire oppressed Europeans, Ottoman officials did not decide how to treat Americans. 
Morgenthau believed that this would allow the United States to become the “peacemaker” 
between the Ottomans and Europeans.51  The events leading up to that point showed Americans 
losing more privileges, similar to those of their European counterparts from June-July, 1914.  
Privileges were taken away when an American reported “that the police and soldiers took from 
him flour and hides to the value of Liras 800.  The sacks of flour that they could not take away 
                                               
49 Smyrna to Constantinople, June 9th, 1914 (National Archives),  RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (4.1). 
 
50 Beirut to Washington, August 7th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/639. 
(13.2). 
 
51 Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (1918), 131. 
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owing to lack of carts, they ripped open with knives.  The receipt given was the usual piece of 
dirty paper.”52 This event showed how one American lost property within the Ottoman Empire.  
This lack of focus is important because scholarship suggests that there was not an American 
victim in the Ottoman Empire, but only Greeks, Armenians, and members of the Entente powers.  
The intentions of the Turks were to alienate any potential enemy of the empire, to which the 
Americans were seen differently due to the neutral stance the US took to the Ottoman Empire. 
Another instance on August 17, 1914, began when Ottoman soldiers visited another 
American shop and asked for five sacks of flour; the owner stated that he did not have any flour 
“but he was informed that it was his business to obtain it and that he would be held responsible 
for that amount on the following day.”53  These practices continued with men like this facing the 
harsh reality of being within a country that created constant tragedies of war and by September, 
properties owned by Americans were seized forcefully.  The government paid nothing in cash, 
but occasionally gave receipts for the value of items taken, so that a payment could be paid out 
of the next year’s budget.54  The confiscation of property eventually expanded to American 
businesses causing more outrage by Americans living in the Ottoman Empire.  During the 
seizure of business property, Americans were left defenseless by their consulate to deal with the 
Ottomans while the government officials took horses throughout the night.55  Americans were 
                                               
52 American Consulate-General to Constantinople, July 14th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, 
Roll 5. (22.2). 
 
53 Haifa to Beirut, August 17th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (28.1). 
 
54 Aleppo to Constantinople, September 3rd, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (37.2). 
 
55 Aleppo to Constantinople, September 3rd, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (37.2). 
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subjected to changing laws and those who refused to pay were arrested for standing up to 
government officials.   
Policies within the Ottoman Empire began to change in June 1914, to favor what the 
government continued to require from foreigners.   As mentioned earlier, this began with the 
Greeks, who were pushed out of the empire by boycotters utilizing whips.  In Smyrna, an 
American citizen purchased a piece of bread from a Greek owned bakery.  Upon leaving the 
bakery, “he was set upon by three boycotters who beat him with clubs, and, taking his bread 
away from him, threw it into the gutter.”56  Morgenthau fought against this change in policy with 
his belief that once the Dardanelles had closed, there was little chance that an outside 
government could help aliens within the empire; “the capitulatory rights, under which they had 
lived for centuries, had been abrogated.  There was really nothing between the foreign residents 
and the destruction except the American flag.”57 Morgenthau used the American flag to practice 
in governmental protests against the Ottoman Empire’s support of boycotters.  Morgenthau also 
performed political protests; however, it was not until June 19, that he realized that the Ottoman 
government’s lack of action to stop it suggested that they wanted the boycotting to happen.58  It 
later became evident that Americans would be subjected to the same laws as Ottoman subjects, 
with no protection from their consulate due to the abolishment of capitulations.   
A few months passed before the Ottoman officials systematically targeted Americans.  In 
one case, an American by the name of Finkelstein, who worked for Standard Oil Company, stood 
                                               
56 Smyrna to Constantinople, June 9th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (4.2). 
 
57 Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (1918), 130. 
 
58 Constantinople to Washington, June 19th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5, 
867.00/630. (3.1). 
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up for his Greek employee who was accused of not paying his taxes.  When he confronted the 
Ottoman soldiers, they arrested him for interfering in their work with the Greek employee.59  
This was the only case that was documented by the local consulate that happened after October 
1.  This date is important because when capitulations were abolished, it closed the post offices 
which was the major communication method at the time.60  It is possible that such events against 
Americans continued, but due to the abolition of capitulations, the local consul was no longer 
able to involve itself with individual American interests.  The only other set of events that came 
to be an issue for the Americans was that of the policies created to make their lives more 
difficult.   
During the months leading up to the Great War, scholars have overlooked the policies 
created in the Ottoman Empire that oppressed American citizens within the empire.  Within the 
Ottoman Empire, people who were non-Turks faced policies that were created to support the 
Ottoman mobilization for war.  This began as early as June 9, 1914, when the American consul 
in Smyrna suggested that the forced migration of Muslims into Christian communities was 
conducted by the Governor of the Province. The consul supported this when he stated, “It is only 
when the mussulmans are officially incited against Christians that they resort to brutality.”61 The 
brutality was similar to the Greeks, suggesting that government-sponsored brutality was 
indifferent to nationality due to the multiethnic nature of the empire.  
                                               
59 Smyrna to Constantinople, October 6th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M365, Roll 7 Ext. (15.2). 
 
60 While the telegraph could have also been used, when communicating transcontinentally, the use of mail 
was still widely prevalent.  Mail was also important because it allowed for documentation to be forwarded it to 
Constantinople.   
61 Smyrna to Constantinople, June 9th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (4.1). 
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On July 18, 1914, Ottoman soldiers demonstrated their brutality towards Greeks in the 
Long Island Massacre in Uzunada. The island is located in the Ege Denizi (Aegean Sea), east of 
Izmir, and was occupied by “Greek fisher-folk, whom a “detachment of 80 Turkish soldiers” 
targeted and took sixteen Greek peasants prisoners.62 The prisoners did not commit any crimes 
warranting arrest. While taking an order from the lieutenant, the soldiers marched their prisoners 
away from the fields that they were working in and killed the prisoners.63 This report also 
verifies that soldiers took two girls and repeatedly raped them throughout the night. This report 
was supported by Mrs. Giraud, “an English subject, who was living alone in her house at the 
time,” who saw the two girls and eleven new graves.64 The government did not charge the 
perpetrators and Greeks were continually dehumanized, without recourse from the law.   
Americans were faced with a challenging atmosphere created by Ottoman officials who 
were above the law and took property from Americans, while arresting anyone who challenged 
them.   While it was unlawful for the Ottoman Empire to take property from Americans, the 
Ottoman government abolished capitulations to support their desires on October 1, 1914.  The 
atmosphere created was that of fear, fear that the Ottoman military would come at any time and 
take whatever you owned, fear that death was ever present in your near future, fear that the city 
around you could erupt into chaos at any moment.  An atmosphere that could be negated with the 
use of American men-of-war as they entered and exited the harbors of Anatolia.  However, 
                                               
62 American Vice Consul-General to Constantinople, July 18th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box 
M353, Roll 5. (10.1). 
 
63 American Vice to Constantinople, July 18th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (10.1). 
 
64 American Vice to Constantinople, July 18th, 1914 (National Archives), RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. 
(10.1). 
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American property was not truly challenged until it became apparent that the Ottoman 
government would take property from American businesses.   
While recent research has started to show more of a direct look at the United States 
during World War I within the Ottoman Empire, researchers have stopped with Henry 
Morgenthau’s biographies and have looked no further.  This thesis has shown that the US had 
political, social, and economic interests within the Ottoman Empire.  These political interests 
included the US’ international standing, who its allies were, and with use of the Navy, were able 
to persuade local politics of the Ottoman government.  In regards to social issues regarding 
Americans were the changing of Ottoman policies and actions taken against those who were not 
deemed Turks, American’s loss of property within the empire, and a few instances of Americans 
being arrested without committing any crimes.  The economic interests focused specifically on 
the maintenance and construction of businesses within a hostile conflict by using the examples of 
Standard Oil Company, Singer Manufacturing Company, and Buffalo Speciality Company,.   
This research into United States’ interests within the Ottoman Empire is important 
because it gives us a clearer narrative of US imperialism at the time.  The US was interested in 
expanding its influence to the Ottoman Empire, but unlike the ideals of  New Manifest Destiny, 
the sole American interest in this region was to create trade with the Empire, not to conquer it.  
Due to the ever increasing nature of the Great War, the Ottoman Empire degraded its relationship 
with the Americans by eventually treating them like any other foreign nation, with ever 
increasing pressures of Turkish nationalism.  The US may have had the cure for the sick man of 
Europe, but due to the decision to enter the Great War, the death sentence was secured for the 
Ottoman Empire 
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Link to movie: 
https://drive.google.com/a/unca.edu/file/d/0B_19mhFo0tuCeENmZWtYSUZ1X1E/view?usp=sh
aring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Images show the who is who in the conflict. 
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Source: Constantinople to Washington, April 12th, 1913, (National Archives), General Records, 
RG 84, Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2183 through IMG_1894, IMG_2252). 
 
Note: All of the countries, excluding the United States, year end dollar amount values are from 
March 12, 1912.  The United States goes through to December 31, 1912, as it along 
with Russia, were largely affected by the Balkan Wars of 1912. 
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Aleppo to Constantinople. “September 3rd, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, 
Microfilm. RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (37.2). 
 
There is property being taken away from American businesses.  There is also businesses 
within the city being burned down and the consulate employees are beginning to be 
conscripted.   
 
A---e. “October 26th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. RG 84, Box 
M365, Roll 8. (3.1). 
 
This document discusses the need for American ships in Alexandretta.  There are fire 
trucks being used to spray oil in buildings which causes huge risks for American interests 
in losing their investments of their businesses.   
 
American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant. “May 26th, 1914.” National Archives of the 
United States, General Records, RG 84, Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2051). 
 
This is the response back to the Buffalo Specialty Company saying that they have found 
the man they were inquiring about and have sent his statement back to the company.  In 
his statement he states that the economic condition within the country is not yet ready for 
new business of liquid veneer.   
 
American Consulate-General to Constantinople, “July 14th, 1914.” National Archives of the 
United States, Microfilm. RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (22.2). 
 
This document was an instance of privileges beginning taken away and the damage done 
to goods not taken.   
 
American Vice Consul-General to Constantinople. “July 18th, 1914.” National Archives of the 
United States, Microfilm. RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (10.1). 
 
This document describes the Long Island massacre involving sixteen dead greeks and two 
young greek women who were raped by Ottoman soldiers.   
 
Beirut to Washington. “August 7th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. 
RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5, 867.00/639. (13.2). 
 
This document discusses the mobilization of 95% of the population and shows that 
20,000-40,000 men of military age have fled to Lebanon to avoid military conscription.  
It also shows Americans praying for the arrival of an American men-of-war because the 
Ottoman government is taking food, horses, and camels.  Good horses are being taken to 
Lebanon to avoid this.   
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B---n. “August 15th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box M353, Roll 
5, 867.00/644. (18.1). 
 
This document discusses the French consulate and the mistreatment of foreigners.  It also 
shows the unlawful seizure of foreign property.  There is also a requisition of bags to fill 
with sand to through into the Suez Canal.  There is also a proclamation for an American 
men-of-war.   
 
B---n. “September 24th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box M353, 
Roll 5, 867.00/689. (43). 
 
The muslim women and children are in fear of a foreign naval bombardment and are 
moving inland.  The USS North Carolina arrives during this time and leaves shortly 
afterwards to protect American and foreign interests.   
 
B---n. “September 25th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box M353, 
Roll 5, 867.00/690. (44). 
 
This document begins the early showing of a United States world police.  It also shows 
the possibility of the Ottoman Empire talking about a naval strike in the Black Sea. 
 
B---n. “October 24th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box M365, Roll 
8, 867.00/709. (1). 
 
This document shows that the arrival of the USS Tennessee creates a peace within the 
area due to the presence of an American men-of-war.   
 
Buffalo Specialty Company. “April 15th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, General 
Records, RG 84, Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2046). 
 
This company is inquiring to the state department about a man to find out if he has started 
a business with their liquid veneer.   
 
B---y. “November 12th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, General Records, RG 84, 
Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2055). 
 
The company is again sending a letter to the state department as they have not yet heard 
back from their partner trying to open business within the Ottoman Empire. 
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Constantinople to Washington. April 12th, 1913. National Archives of the United States, 
General Records. RG 84, Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2183 through IMG_1894, 
IMG_2252). 
 
These documents show all of the exports of Russia, Belgium, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, France, Austria-Hungary, and the United States during 1912. 
 
C---n. “June 11th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. RG 84, Box M353, 
Roll 5. 867.00/626. (1.1). 
 
This is a report that shows a downhill in the relationship between the Ottoman Empire 
and Greece.  The Ottomans begin oppressing their Greek citizens.  Singer Manufacturing 
Company is being affected by this due to most of their workforce is Greek.  There is a cry 
for the protection of American interests.   
 
C---n. “June 19th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box M353, Roll 5, 
867.00/630. (3-3.1). 
 
This collection of documents illustrates a downturn in events.  It discusses boycotters 
preventing women from working at MacAndrews & Forbes Company and Singer 
Manufacturing Company.  It shows that the Grand Vizier was requested to protect 
interest and shows that the Turkish government was not doing anything to stop the 
violence. 
 
C---n. “October 1th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box M365, Roll 
7, 711.673/45. (10). 
 
It is this document that shows Morgenthau suggesting that the USS North Carolina not 
stay in Turkey.   
 
C---n. “October 19th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box M353, Roll 
5, 867.00/692. (45.2). 
 
There is a large concern of German and Turkish actions with the Goeben and the Breslau.  
It shows specifically the amount of men being massed through military mobilization and 
discusses that there are a large amount of death threats being sent to the British 
ambassador.   
 
Constantinople to Washington. “November 4th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, 
General Records. RG 84, Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2183). 
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This document discusses the gathering of boxes of different consulates and bringing them 
to the US consulate to protect the interests of other foreign nations.   
 
Consulate General of Constantinople. “December 8rd, 1914.” National Archives of the United 
States, General Records. RG 84, Turkey, Box 6-8. (IMG_2056). 
 
This is the last reply sent to Buffalo Specialty Company stating that there is not a good 
time right now to be sending letters back and forth due to the Ottoman Empire engaged in 
World War I. 
 
Haifa to Beirut. “August 6th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. Box 
M353, Roll 5. (19). 
 
This telegram shows that the Muslims within the empire are in favor of marching against 
Russia and states that 6,000 muslims have started a march towards Egypt.   
 
H---t. “August 17th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. RG 84, Box 
M353, Roll 5. (28.1). 
 
Foreigners are having to now give contributions to the Ottoman government.  There is a 
question of these requisitions and it is deemed that property is allowed to be taken by the 
military.   
 
Henry Morgenthau to Secretary of State, August 8-11, 1914, The Ambassador in Turkey 
(Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State, Outbreak of The War- Projects of Mediation, 
Foreign Relations of the United States Database (FRUS), University of Wisconsin-
Madison Libraries, Digital Collections, 763.72/447.  763.72/447. 
 
This document shows that the Goeben and the Breslau have already traveled up the 
Dardanelles Strait.   
 
Smyrna to Constantinople. “June 9th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm.  
RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. (4.1-4.2). 
 
This telegram was a warning sent to Morgenthau of what has been going on in Smyrna.  
There are boycotters here standing in front of store with whips to drive customers away.  
It suspects that the governor is behind the boycotts.  It also discusses what Singer 
Manufacturing Company is going through with its employees.  It discusses that Greek 
women and children are being whipped by Ottoman officers without reason. 
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S---e. “October 6th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. RG 84, Box 
M365, Roll 7 Ext. (15.1-15.2). 
 
This document shows that Standard Oil Company’s depot has been invaded by the 
Ottoman government to go after people who did not pay their taxes.  There is an 
American arrested during this confrontation along with a Greek and a Muslim.   
 
Smyrna to Washington. “June 18th, 1914.” National Archives of the United States, Microfilm. 
RG 84, Box M353, Roll 5. 867.00/629. (2). 
 
This document shows repeated demands by the Americans.  It also shows that the 
Ottoman governor is making an effort to clean up what has been going on. 
 
Morgenthau, Henry, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story. Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918. 
 
This book contains Morgenthau’s story of his ambassadorship to Constantinople.  I have 
just received this book but I feel it will help put into context my primary sources.  It was 
also one of the major source Karine Walther uses in Sacred Interests.   
 
Morgenthau, Henry, All in a Life-Time. Doubleday, Page & Company, 1921-1922. 
 
This is a biography by Morgenthau discussing the events throughout his life.  I have just 
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Walther’s Sacred Interests.  
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Eugene Rogan, a scholar of Middle East history, goes into detail of the events leading up 
to the assault on the Dardanelles Strait. It provides the necessary information to give 
details about the whereabouts going on in the late Ottoman Empire.  His book will be 
used to discuss the events surrounding my primary sources showing why certain letters 
were sent to the Department of State. 
 
Shaw, Stanford J. The Ottoman Empire in World War I. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 
2006. 
 
Stanford’s book deals with the history of the Ottoman Empire as well as the political 
history.  His book also provides the needed context to place within my historiography.  
His book will support Caroline Finkel’s Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman 
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Empire. The Shaws are foundational to understand the Young Turk movement which is 
where he will be used when discussing political history.   
 
Walther, Karine V. Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821-
1921. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.  
 
Karine Walther discusses in her book the United States’ role within the Islamic world.  
The last chapter focuses specifically on US and Ottoman Relations focusing on Henry 
Morgenthau’s ambassadorship there.  Her work will be used within my historiography to 
provide the context to where research is headed today, with my work picking up where 
she left off when it comes to American interests in the Ottoman Empire during the 
Summer and Fall of 1914.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
